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THE PARADOX OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: POLITICAL 
CONFORMITY AND CHAOS IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
KEVIN M. KRUSE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, Southern politicians 
defiantly declared that they would never submit to that “intolerable” and 
“monstrous” decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.  Instead, they promised to 
stage a fierce political campaign of “massive resistance” to court-ordered 
desegregation.  Indeed, for the remainder of the 1950s, the defiance of these 
segregationists dominated the political, social, and legal landscape of the 
region and choked off all progress towards meaningful integration. 
These leaders of massive resistance claimed they were defending the 
individual rights of Southerners, but in truth their movement was one based 
first and foremost on the concept of conformity.  Hoping to maintain white 
supremacy through white solidarity, segregationists pushed through a wide 
array of legislation that severely restricted the range of political and social 
discourse in the region.  Not content merely to shore up their segregationist 
base, the forces of massive resistance also targeted the small numbers of white 
liberals and black activists in their midst, effectively marginalizing them from 
the Southern scene for the better part of a decade.  Ironically, however, this 
sweeping campaign of top-down political pressure precluded any meaningful 
attempt at organizing ordinary white Southerners.  In the end, as the combined 
power of the courts and the civil rights movement dismantled the machinery of 
massive resistance across the South, these politicians found that the whites 
whom they purported to lead were nowhere to be found.1 
This, then, was the fundamental paradox of the massive resistance 
movement.  The region’s leading segregationists succeeded in their quest for 
rigid political conformity, only to find that their actions did nothing to get 
 
* Kevin M. Kruse is Assistant Professor of History and David L. Rike University Preceptor of 
History at Princeton University.  He is the author of White Flight: Race, Place and Politics in 
Atlanta, forthcoming from Princeton University Press. 
 1. See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND 
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S 67-81, 190-236, 341-43 (1969). 
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ordinary whites organized for their cause.  This problem played itself out in all 
the Southern states, to one degree or another, but it is perhaps most clearly 
observed in Georgia.  There, the state’s segregationists created a 
comprehensive political program of massive resistance, overseen by major 
officeholders and official watchdog groups like the Georgia Commission on 
Education.  These forces not only succeeded in enforcing conformity for the 
vast majority of white Georgians, but also managed to identify and isolate all 
“threats” to the racial status quo, real or imagined.  In the end, however, the 
work of these segregationists resulted in only a hollow victory.  They had 
hoped to get the white population both enraged and engaged in the “defense” 
of segregation, but their actions, in fact, encouraged those same whites to 
remain uninterested in segregationist organizations and uninvolved with their 
activities.  Assured that the state’s leadership had the problem well in hand, 
they felt no need to join the grass-roots groups supporting the segregationist 
cause.  The States’ Rights Council of Georgia, for instance, had been 
established as an avenue for marshalling the anger of segregationist whites 
behind the massive resistance movement, but in the end it proved unable to 
attract many members, or much interest, for that matter.  And without a broad 
political constituency behind it, massive resistance lost its relevance as a mass 
movement. 
II.  ENFORCING CONFORMITY: THE GEORGIA COMMISSION ON EDUCATION 
When he first heard about the Brown decision, Governor Herman 
Talmadge was in the small town of Lafayette, Georgia.  Just as the governor 
was about to begin his stump speech—in a touch of irony, his topic that day 
was the state’s successes with separate-but-equal education—a friend told him 
that the Atlanta Journal had been frantically trying to reach him.2  “I 
immediately knew what had happened,” Talmadge recalled.  “Within minutes, 
I had borrowed a DC-4, and in less than an hour I was back in Atlanta.”3  His 
staff met him at the Governor’s Mansion with the latest wire releases on the 
decision.  As Talmadge prepared his statement, his aides frantically arranged a 
press conference on the lawn of the Governor’s Mansion, bundling 
microphones together with rubber bands, and hurrying to get the press in line.4  
In spite of the rush, Talmadge seemed well-prepared.  Speaking without notes, 
the governor stared directly into rows of newsreel, television, and newspaper 
 
 2. FREDERICK ALLEN, ATLANTA RISING: THE INVENTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CITY 
1946–1990 52-53 (1996); HERMAN E. TALMADGE WITH MARK ROYDEN WINCHELL, 
TALMADGE: A POLITICAL LEGACY, A POLITICIAN’S LIFE 154-55 (1987). 
 3. TALMADGE & WINCHELL, supra note 2, at 155. 
 4. Telex Report, NEWSWEEK (May 17, 1954) (on file with Emory University, Atlanta, 
Woodruff Library, Special Collections, Newsweek Atlanta Bureau Files, Box 16) [hereinafter 
NAB]. 
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cameras, denouncing the ruling in no uncertain terms.5  “The court has thrown 
down the gauntlet before those who believe the Constitution means what it 
says when it reserves to the individual states the right to regulate their own 
internal affairs,” Talmadge thundered.6  “Georgians accept the challenge and 
will not tolerate the mixing of the races in the public schools or any of its 
public tax-supported institutions.”7  His statement delivered, the governor 
strode back into the mansion, sat down in an overstuffed maroon armchair, and 
began taking calls from across the nation.  He chatted with reporters for a 
while, defending segregation strongly but with as much Southern charm as he 
could muster.  After a while, however, he tired of it all and told his wife to 
inform future callers that the governor was busy inspecting the Confederate 
troops outside.8 
The press still found choice comments from other Georgian politicians, 
who echoed the governor’s tone and temper.  U.S. Senator Richard Russell, for 
instance, released a stern statement denouncing the Court’s “flagrant abuse of 
judicial power.”9  The Justices, he charged, had destroyed the rights “plainly 
guaranteed” by the Constitution for states “to direct their most vital local 
affairs.”10  Lieutenant Governor Marvin Griffin, then beginning a successful 
gubernatorial campaign, seconded these sentiments.  He lamented that “[t]he 
meddlers, demagogues, race[-]baiters and Communists are determined to 
destroy every vestige of states’ rights.”11  Under his administration, the future 
governor promised the races would not be mixed, “come hell or high water.”12  
A defiant Attorney General Eugene Cook, meanwhile, claimed the ruling did 
not apply to Georgia and predicted that segregation would continue in the 
state’s schools “until we are forced to abandon it by legal action applied to 
every school unit in the state.”13 
In spite of their professed shock, Georgia’s legislators had long anticipated 
that the Supreme Court would make a ruling along the lines of the Brown 
decision.  At the start of the 1950s, for instance, Governor Talmadge realized 
that the blatantly unequal distribution of school funding could bring the 
charade of “separate but equal” education in Georgia to an ignominious end.  
 
 5. Interview by Harold Paulk Henderson with Herman Talmadge, Georgia Governor (June 
26 and July 17, 1987) (transcript on file with Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia 
Government Documentation Project) [hereinafter GGDP]. 
 6. Talmadge Text, ATLANTA CONST., May 18, 1954, at 9. 
 7. Id. 
 8. ALLEN, supra note 2, at 53-54. 
 9. GILBERT C. FITE & RICHARD B. RUSSELL, JR., SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 331 (1991). 
 10. Id. 
 11. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 68. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Ruling Doesn’t Apply to Georgia, Cook Says, Pledging Long Fight, ATLANTA CONST., 
May 18, 1954, at 1. 
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Frantically, he tried to paper over the problem.  In 1951, he pushed through a 
sales tax to finance the Minimum Foundation Program for Education, which 
equalized the pay of white and black teachers and provided other benefits for 
black schools.14  A year later, he created a State School Building Authority to 
sell bonds for new school construction across the state.15  In Atlanta, for 
example, a new school bond called for the creation of eleven new black 
schools—called “Supreme Court schools” because they had been hastily built 
in anticipation of the likely desegregation decision.16  On paper, at least, such 
steps narrowed the gap between white and black schooling.  In 1940, for 
instance, each black student received approximately thirty-one percent of what 
each white student received in state funding; by 1952, the percentage had more 
than doubled to sixty-eight percent.17  Such expenditures, however, did little to 
make up for the incredible disparities in educational funding during the 
previous half century.  In any case, Georgia made it abundantly clear that it 
was only making its schools “equal” to keep them “separate.”  Both the state 
constitution and the appropriations act stated that any school that served both 
black and white students would be immediately stripped of its funding.18 
As an added measure, Governor Talmadge proposed in November 1953 a 
controversial constitutional amendment to grant the General Assembly the 
power to privatize the state’s entire system of public education.19  In the event 
of court-ordered desegregation, school buildings would be closed and students 
would instead receive grants to attend private—and therefore still segregated—
schools.20  The “private school plan,” as it was commonly known, was openly 
acknowledged to be a segregationist scheme.21  “We can maintain separate 
schools regardless of the U.S. Supreme Court,” Talmadge promised, “by 
reverting to a private system, subsidizing the child rather than the political 
 
 14. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 41-42. 
 15. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Sept. 3, 1954, at 5. 
 16. RONALD H. BAYOR, RACE AND THE SHAPING OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY ATLANTA 219 
(1996). 
 17. Georgia, supra note 15. 
 18. Id.; W. D. Workman, Jr., The Deep South, in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 
SEGREGATION-DESEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN SCHOOLS 88, 92 (Don Shoemaker ed., 1957) 
[hereinafter WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED]. 
 19. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 54. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Nov. 4, 1954, at 10.  Indeed, many of the 
plan’s supporters preferred to call it “the segregation amendment,” because they felt the stress on 
“private schools” sounded elitist.  Id. 
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subdivision.”22  The General Assembly agreed, quickly passing the amendment 
and arranging for its ratification on the next year’s ballot.23 
To drum up public support for the private school plan, the state legislature 
created the Georgia Commission on Education (“GCE” or “Commission”) in 
January 1954.24  Officially, the GCE was established to “make plans for the 
state to provide adequate education consistent with both the state and federal 
constitutions.”25  In practice, however, the Commission acted solely to protect 
segregated education in Georgia.  Its membership included the state’s leading 
advocates of massive resistance—not just politicians like Governor Talmadge, 
Lieutenant Governor Griffin, Attorney General Cook, and Talmadge’s 
appointees to state educational posts, but also private citizens, such as 
constitutional expert Charles J. Bloch and noted campaign manager Roy V. 
Harris.26  Durwood T. Pye, an Atlanta attorney, was chosen as Executive 
Secretary.27  Like the other GCE members, Secretary Pye was a fervent 
segregationist.28  Under Pye’s direction, the GCE led the public campaign for 
passage of the “private school plan.”29  In the months before the November 
1954 vote on the constitutional amendment, for instance, the Commission 
spent $13,000 on mass mailings alone, using additional money for newspaper 
ads.30  Individual members also spoke out for the amendment.  Lieutenant 
Governor Griffin, for example, hailed the measure as “a second Bill of Rights” 
for the people of Georgia.31  The governor and attorney general also 
campaigned actively, and the state Democratic Party sponsored television ads 
in support of the amendment.32  When Georgians went to the polls, they passed 
the proposal by a margin of 210,488 to 181,148.33  “I hope it will never 
become necessary to use the amendment,” Governor Talmadge announced 
 
 22. Susan Margaret McGrath, Great Expectations: The History of School Desegregation in 
Atlanta and Boston, 1954–1990, at 59 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) 
(on file with the James G. Kenan Research Center Archives, Atlanta History Center, Atlanta). 
 23. Georgia, supra note 15. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See GEORGIA COMMISSION ON EDUCATION, REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE GEORGIA COMMISSION ON EDUCATION, at i (1954) [hereinafter 
EDUCATION REPORT]. 
 27. Paul Douglas Bolster, Civil Rights Movements in Twentieth Century Georgia 136 
(1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia). 
 28. A contemporary remembered him as “a stern, formal, and fanatical man, whose wont it 
was to sniff and twitch.”  MORRIS B. ABRAM, THE DAY IS SHORT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 97 
(1982). 
 29. See Thomas O’Brien, Georgia’s Response to Brown v. Board of Education, 1954–1961, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION (1992), at 56. 
 30. Bolster, supra note 27, at 136. 
 31. Georgia, supra note 21. 
 32. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 54. 
 33. Workman, supra note 18, at 98. 
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after the vote, “but this should put the Supreme Court of the United States and 
the people of this nation on notice that the people of Georgia are determined to 
preserve segregation.”34 
In addition to working for the passage of the private school plan, the GCE 
made sure that a “true segregationist” would sit in the governor’s office after 
Herman Talmadge’s term ended.  During the summer of 1954, candidates 
made formal appearances before the Commission to outline their plans for 
preserving segregated schools.35  Spectators packed the Senate chamber of the 
statehouse, along with cameras from both the local television stations and the 
networks, to watch as competitors for the Democratic nomination sketched out 
their plans.36  A lesser-known candidate offered a direct solution to the 
desegregation decision—they should simply abolish the Supreme Court.37  But 
the front-runners were no less inventive.  Agricultural Commissioner Tom 
Linder, for instance, proposed that officials canvass the state, asking parents to 
swear under oath whether they wanted segregated or integrated schools for 
their children.38  Those few who chose integrated schools, he explained, would 
simply be turned over to a psychiatrist and promptly committed to the state’s 
mental institution.  They would have to be crazy.39  But Marvin Griffin stole 
the show.  The son of a Klansman, Griffin took great pains to appear as the 
most dedicated segregationist in the election.40  He proudly proclaimed himself 
“the white man’s candidate” and spent a good deal of time lashing out against 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
“Yankee carpetbaggers,” and other “meddlers” as he stumped across the 
state.41  School officials, he told the Commission, should “hold the line” and 
not “permit[] [the entry of] any Negro in white schools.”42  The races, he 
repeated over and over again, would never be “mixed” during his 
administration, “come hell or high water!”43  Not surprisingly, that fall, Griffin 
swept into the governor’s office, guaranteeing that the “defense” of segregated 
schools would continue at the highest levels of state government for another 
four years. 
 
 34. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Dec. 1, 1954, at 8. 
 35. See BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 68. 
 36. ATLANTA J., June 9, 1954. 
 37. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 68. 
 38. Id. at 68-69. 
 39. Georgia, supra note 15; BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 69.  See Bolster, supra note 27, at 
137 n.9. 
 40. See Robert W. Dubay, Marvin Griffin and the Politics of the Stump, in GEORGIA 
GOVERNORS IN AN AGE OF CHANGE: FROM ELLIS ARNALL TO GEORGE BUSBEE 101, 110-11 
(Harold P. Henderson & Gary L. Roberts eds., 1988). 
 41. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Oct. 1, 1954, at 10. 
 42. Albert Riley, Attorneys Hint Board Favors Private School Plan for Segregation, 
ATLANTA CONST., June 10, 1954, at 1. 
 43. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 68. 
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During Griffin’s administration, the GCE continued to lead the state’s 
defense of segregated education.  When the legislature convened in January 
1955, Durwood Pye placed the problem directly before them: “How may the 
people of Georgia be protected against this decision?”44  The main means of 
protection would be the private school plan, of course.45  Such a plan, Pye 
claimed, only required money for tuition, buildings for classes, a little state 
regulation, and a provision that the schools would be free from the interference 
of the federal courts.46  But as added measures against desegregation, the GCE 
authored a number of other proposals for the legislature’s approval.  One 
suggestion, for instance, was a bill to make it a felony—punishable by two 
years imprisonment and a heavy fine—for any school official in the state to 
spend tax money on “mixed” schools.47  It easily became law.48  Support in 
Georgia’s House was so strong that the measure succeeded by a simple show 
of hands, 105 to 2.49  Other proposals from Pye’s commission were routed onto 
the legislative calendar to ensure that the assembly had enough opportunities to 
rail against the Court’s ruling as the year wore on.50 
Though Pye’s proposals were appreciated, the Georgia General Assembly 
did not need any prodding.  In the first month of its 1955 session alone, the 
legislature demanded that public school teachers take oaths refusing to teach 
“mixed classes,” considered a proposal to fine anyone taking part in integrated 
sporting events, called for a federal constitutional amendment against the 
integration of the armed forces, urged Congress to make states alone 
responsible for matters of education, and tighten the requirements for Justices 
of the Supreme Court.51  The most memorable measure of defiance, however, 
was a simple one.  In February 1956, the legislature changed the state flag, 
replacing its three red and white stripes with the St. Andrew’s cross, 
commonly known as “The Battle Flag of the Confederacy.”52  Legislators 
claimed the change was simply a way to mark the upcoming centennial of the 
Civil War.53  House leader Denmark Groover claimed the state needed to 
“replace those meaningless stripes with something having deep meaning in the 
 
 44. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Feb. 3, 1955, at 6. 
 45. See EDUCATION REPORT, supra note 26, at 7-16. 
 46. Georgia, supra note 44. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), March 3, 1955, at 7. 
 49. See id. 
 50. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 75. 
 51. Georgia, supra note 48.  The teachers’ oath proposal remained tabled in committee 
because many considered it a “superfluous” bill, given that the ban on spending tax money for 
integrated schools was already on the books.  See id. 
 52. John Walker Davis, An Air of Defiance: Georgia’s State Flag Change of 1956, 82 GA. 
HIST. Q. 305, 317, 323 (1998). 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 322. 
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hearts of all true Southerners.”54  (If the General Assembly truly sought to 
honor the Confederacy, however, they should have left the original flag intact.  
The “meaningless stripes” that Groover mocked were actually the “bars” from 
the “Stars and Bars” flag of the Confederacy, which had, in turn, been 
incorporated into the Georgia flag by State Senator Herman H. Perry, a 
Confederate veteran who designed the state flag specifically as “a tribute to the 
Confederate dead.”)55  In any case, despite the lip service paid to honoring the 
Confederate dead in 1956, most Georgians recognized the flag change as a 
declaration of war in a new battle to preserve segregation.56  “It will serve 
notice” Groover acknowledged, “that we intend to uphold what we stood for, 
will stand for, and will fight for.”57 
The private school plan remained the heart of that fight.  During the 1956 
legislative session, the Georgia General Assembly strengthened the plan with a 
number of new laws.  The cornerstones—the governor’s power to close 
“mixed” schools and offer tuition grants to individual students—were 
reaffirmed.58  As added measures, the legislature laid out a plan for the transfer 
of all public school property to private hands and ensured that all public school 
teachers would still be covered by the state retirement program when they 
started teaching at private institutions.59  Not a single detail was left untouched.  
Procedures for fire marshal examinations of private schools, for instance, were 
reworded and made to conform to the standards for public schools.60  If the 
courts ordered their schools to desegregate, the governor could now switch 
everything to a “private” system without missing a single beat.61 
Even as they were preparing for the complete transfer of Georgia’s schools 
from public to private hands, however, the legislature continued to deny that 
the Supreme Court had any jurisdiction over those schools.  Much like many 
other Southern states, Georgia asserted the doctrines of interposition and 
nullification—claiming, in essence, that a state could “interpose” its authority 
between the federal government and local citizens and thereby declare 
federally-made decisions “null and void” within the boundaries of the state.62  
“[T]he State of Georgia has at no time surrendered to the General Government 
 
 54. Id. at 325. 
 55. Id. at 326. 
 56. See id. at 326-27. 
 57. Davis, supra note 52, at 327. 
 58. Segregation Measures, Interposition Are Adopted in Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, 
Tenn.), Mar. 1956, at 10 [hereinafter Segregation Measures]. 
 59. Id.  
 60. See Georgia Lawmakers Take Action on 6 Private School Measures, S. SCH. NEWS 
(Nashville, Tenn.), Feb. 1956, at 13 [hereinafter Georgia Lawmakers]; Segregation Measures, 
supra note 58. 
 61. See Georgia Lawmakers, supra note 60. 
 62. See BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 127–28; ‘Interposition’ Weighed in Four States, S. SCH. 
NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Jan. 1956, at 1. 
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its rights to maintain racially separate public schools and other public 
facilities,” a Georgia House resolution charged.63  “[I]t is clear that [the] Court 
has deliberately resolved to disobey the Constitution of the United States, and 
to flout and defy the Supreme Law of the Land.”64  The desegregation 
decision, legislators argued, was therefore “null, void, and of no force or 
effect.”65  The Georgia Senate supported the nullification resolution 
unanimously, 39 to 0; the Georgia House passed it by a vote of 178 to 1.66  
“You have moved decisively to let the whole nation know that Georgia will 
stand firm for its traditions and ideals,” Governor Griffin noted, “come hell or 
high water.”67  In case anyone missed the point, the legislature then resolved to 
impeach the six still-sitting Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court who had 
originally supported Brown and were, therefore, “guilty of attempting to 
subvert the Constitution of the United States and of [committing] high crimes 
and misdemeanors in office.”68 
Not to be outdone, other state agencies pitched in with their own defense 
of school segregation.  In 1955, State Board of Education Chairman George P. 
Whitman, Jr., another Talmadge appointee, announced that his board would 
stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the legislature.69  “We do not plan, now or 
ever,” he thundered, “to bend or to comply with the nine men of the U.S. 
Supreme Court who have based their anti-segregation ruling on a volume 
compiled by 16 men who are members of Communist front organizations.”70  
Turning to other suspect texts, Whitman mounted a book-banning crusade 
throughout Georgia’s schools.71  Any perceived insult to segregation or the 
South became grounds to reject a book.  Whitman threw out a reader in 
American History, for instance, because it slighted the contributions of 
Southern colonists in the Revolutionary War.72  Likewise, his board banned a 
sociology textbook because it supposedly taught that whites were unfair to 
blacks in elections.73  Such a statement, the board concluded, followed “the 
NAACP line” and tried to “‘condition’ white children to the idea that color 
 
 63. Interposition and Nullification—Georgia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 438, 438 (1956). 
 64. Id. at 440. 
 65. Id.; Interposition vs. Judicial Power: A Study of Ultimate Authority in Constitutional 
Questions, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 465, 466 (1956). 
 66. Segregation Measures, supra note 58. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Patrick E. McCauley, “Be It Enacted,” in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 
SEGREGATION-DESEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN SCHOOLS 130, 131 (Don Shoemaker ed., 1957). 
 69. See Georgia Board Drops Teacher Ban, Leaves to Local Units, S. SCH. NEWS 
(Nashville, Tenn.), Sept. 1955, at 16 [hereinafter Georgia Board]. 
 70. See id.; McGrath, supra note 22, at 84-85. 
 71. JACK NELSON & GENE ROBERTS, JR., THE CENSORS AND THE SCHOOLS 175 (1963). 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
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doesn’t matter.”74  Whitman and his associates even found a student songbook, 
Of Thee We Sing, to be offensive because its editors had changed a word in 
Stephen Foster’s “Old Folks at Home.”75  Distraught at these and other 
perceived outrages, the board decided to establish a more permanent textbook 
committee that could “prevent ‘isms’ from creeping into our schools.”76  In the 
end, the board created not one, but two, such committees.77  They examined all 
literature in the Georgia school system for “anti-southern bias” and general 
merit.78  Books deemed “un-Georgian” were removed from the stacks of 
school libraries and put where they could do no harm.79  “There is no place in 
Georgia schools at any time for anything that disagrees with out [sic] way of 
life,” Whitman solemnly announced.80 
By “anything,” George Whitman meant just that—even teachers.  By this 
time, Georgia’s educators were already obligated to take a number of oaths.  In 
1935, for instance, the legislature established a “Teachers’ Oath,” in which 
educators promised to “refrain from directly or indirectly subscribing to or 
teaching any theory of government or economics or of social relations which is 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of patriotism and high ideals of 
Americanism.”81  This loyalty oath was buttressed in 1949 with another anti-
subversive oath for all state employees, and again in 1953 with the passage of a 
“Security Questionnaire” in which teachers were asked about their 
memberships in suspect groups.82  For segregationists who worried about 
keeping the teachers in line, this array of loyalty oaths was still not enough.  
Therefore, in August 1955, the State Board of Education adopted a resolution 
“to revoke ‘forever’ the license of any teacher who ‘supports, encourages, 
condones, or agrees to teach mixed classes.’”83  This, however, was seen as a 
step too far.  The Board came under fire from a variety of religious and legal 
groups, and ultimately decided to retract the resolutions.84  But they kept in 
place the earlier requirements that teachers sign oaths to “‘uphold, support and 
 
 74. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), June 8, 1955, at 18. 
 75. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), May 4, 1955, at 3; see also NELSON & 
ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 175.  Instead of “Oh, darkies, how my heart grows weary,” the board 
noted with disgust, the revised version read “Oh, brothers, how my heart grows weary.”  See 
Georgia, supra. 
 76. Georgia, supra note 74. 
 77. Georgians Ban ‘Forever’ Teachers of Mixed Groups; Strategy Mapped, S. SCH. NEWS 
(Nashville, Tenn.), Aug. 1955, at 4 [hereinafter Georgians Ban ‘Forever’]. 
 78. See generally Georgia, note 74. 
 79. See generally id. 
 80. Georgia, supra note 75. 
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defend the constitution and laws’ of Georgia,” all of which, of course, called 
for segregated schools.85 
Though its licensing scheme failed, the State Board of Education remained 
watchful of individual teachers who went against the grain of segregation.  In 
1956, for example, the Board tried to discontinue the retirement benefits for 
Dr. Guy Wells, a well-known educator.86  At that time, Wells was serving as 
director of the Georgia Committee on Interracial Cooperation.87  Many 
segregationists complained that he was being a little too cooperative with other 
races and demanded that he be punished.88  As Governor Griffin put it, for 
someone who was drawing a monthly pension from the state, Wells was acting 
“a little ugly.”89  Confronted by his critics, the educator denied any “radical” 
activity.90  “I did deplore the passage of the so-called ‘private school’ laws 
which most people believe are unconstitutional,” he wrote in response to the 
attacks.91  “At no time did I recommend violence or extreme measures, but 
suggested cooperation between the two groups to work out a satisfactory 
solution.”92  That, it seemed, was still too much.  Though the governor pushed 
for the end of Wells’ pension package, the trustees of the fund refused.93  
Undaunted, Griffin managed to convince the Regents of the University System 
to strip the educator of his title as Emeritus President of the Georgia State 
College for Women, solely because of his views on segregation.94 
In a further attempt to chill all discussion of desegregation in the state, the 
Georgia Commission on Education was granted new powers in early 1957.  
The GCE now had the authority to hold hearings and subpoena witnesses.95  
Furthermore, the Commission was granted a budget of $376,000 to spread the 
word about the “Georgia way of life.”96  By this time, Durwood Pye had been 
rewarded for his work on the Commission with an appointment to the Superior 
Court of Fulton County, but his replacement as the GCE’s executive 
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secretary—T. V. Williams, Jr.—was up to the challenge.97  Armed with a 
“dreamy assortment of private-eye equipment,” including several thousand 
dollars in telephone wiretaps, an assortment of pocket microphones, and “a 
camera with a telescopic lens,” Williams set out to uproot the integrationist 
conspiracy in the South.98  Money was apparently no object in his crusade.  
According to a state audit, the Georgia Commission on Education spent more 
than $100,000 during the 1957–58 fiscal year alone.99 
The greatest success of Williams’ many investigations came on the Labor 
Day weekend of 1957.  A photographer on the state payroll, Ed Friend, 
triumphantly announced that he had “made contact and infiltrated” a civil 
rights conference at the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee.100  
In truth, the conference was a public meeting open to everyone.  Friend simply 
showed up, asked to sit in, and proceeded to take pictures of folk singers and 
workshop sessions.101  To commemorate the event, Highlander’s Director, 
Myles Horton, asked the photographer to take a picture of the more notable 
participants—Aubrey Williams, the former head of the National Youth 
Administration, meeting chairman John Thompson, and Rosa Parks and the 
Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., both fresh from the bus boycott in 
Montgomery.102  As soon as Friend could make it back to Atlanta with the 
negatives, the GCE began churning out copies of the photograph in a pamphlet 
titled Communist Training School.103  “The meeting of such a large group of 
specialists in inter-racial strife under the auspices of a Communist Training 
School, and in the company of many known Communists,” the GCE charged, 
“is the typical method whereby leadership training and tactics are furnished to 
the agitators.”104  The pamphlet became an instant success, and Friend’s 
photograph soon appeared on billboards across the South.105  “I tell you,” Roy 
Harris marveled later, “I think we published a million copies of that paper at 
state expense.”106 
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III.  SILENCING PROTEST: GEORGIA’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NAACP 
Although Georgia’s segregationists delighted in “exposing” Martin Luther 
King, Jr., their favorite target by far was the NAACP.  There had been no love 
lost between the state’s segregationists and the NAACP, known to the 
segregationists as an organization of “outside meddlers” that led the fight 
against school segregation.  After the Brown ruling, however, this mutual 
resentment escalated into open conflict. 
The declaration of war came in October 1955, when Georgia’s Attorney 
General, Eugene Cook, addressed the annual convention of the Peace Officers’ 
Association of Georgia.  As the state’s top law enforcement officer, Cook 
praised the troopers and city policemen for their role in “protecting the rights 
and liberties of the people” against a host of threats.107  “It is because of your 
demonstrated discernment in this regard that I have chosen this occasion as the 
proper forum for revealing, for the first time, the authenticated details of the 
most ominous of these threats to arise during our lifetime,” the Attorney 
General announced with a great deal of gravity.108  “I refer to the subversive 
designs behind the current crusade of the misnamed National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People and its fellow-traveling fronts to force 
upon the South the Communist-inspired doctrine of racial integration and 
amalgamation.”109  He then rattled off a list of “citations” of un-American 
activities against individuals associated with the NAACP.110  “[E]ither 
knowingly or unwittingly,” Cook concluded, “[the NAACP] has allowed itself 
to become part and parcel of the Communist conspiracy to overthrow the 
democratic governments of this nation and its sovereign states.”111  “The Ugly 
Truth About the NAACP,” as the speech was thereafter known, became a holy 
text for segregationists throughout Georgia, the South, and the nation.  
Attorney General Cook distributed copies from his office, and gladly allowed 
other segregationist groups to reprint the speech themselves.112  The National 
Citizens Protective Association, based in St. Louis, Missouri included Cook’s 
speech on a list of “Crusading Literature for White Americans” available by 
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mail.  Likewise, the Patriots of North Carolina, an organization akin to the 
Citizens’ Councils, reprinted the speech for its members.113 
Cook’s charges that the NAACP was a radical, dangerous organization 
only confirmed what most whites already believed.  “In the white Southern 
mind the NAACP is very definitely an enemy organization,” noted a 
Newsweek reporter from Atlanta.114  “Politicians have equated [the NAACP] 
with the Klan and Citizens Councils as being extremist; most Southerners 
would see the Association as being more extreme than the Councils and, 
possibly, less extreme than the Klan.”115 
Even whites who held no sympathy for segregationist groups regarded the 
NAACP with a special suspicion.  “I don’t believe in Ku Klux Klan, Black 
Shirts or National Association for the Advancement of the Communist Party,” 
one man complained.116  “The latter is the worst of all, for they use the Colored 
people as dupes just to carry out their dirty points, then the poor Negro can go 
jump in a lake.”117  “Can’t something be done to stop the NAACP?,” asked a 
typical letter.118  “It seems to me we have more to fear from them than we do 
from the Russians.  If something isn’t done to stop the negroes they are in the 
not too distant future going to run this country and the white people will be the 
ones looked down upon.”119  Other white Georgians agreed.  “I think it is high 
time for us to be up and doing something to resist the diabolical efforts of 
NAACP and other subversive influences,” an angry man wrote, “instead of just 
letting things drift, and thereby inviting future generations to rise up and curse 
the day that gave us birth for not doing something about it.”120 
The politicians in the state capital, however, needed little prodding.  In 
January, 1956, Attorney General Cook officially launched the state’s 
counterattack against the NAACP.121  “I want to assure you that the people of 
Georgia are completely fed up,” he privately told the Attorneys General from 
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other southern states, “and are determined to make the NAACP and its allied 
organizations fight for every inch they gain in their efforts to destroy State 
sovereignty and to bring about a mulatto race.”122  Publicly, Cook enlisted the 
support of the Georgia legislature to help him fight the NAACP’s 
“ruthless . . . drive . . . to destroy constitutional government and our traditional 
pattern of racial segregation.”123  Though he hoped to have the organization 
outlawed completely, Cook was willing just to cripple it.124  To hamstring the 
legal staff of the NAACP, for instance, Cook pushed through new laws that 
redefined and constricted the old common law offenses of barratry, champerty, 
and maintenance.125 
The segregationists at the state capital found even greater opportunities in 
their war against the NAACP.  When the Alabama legislature effectively 
outlawed the organization in 1956, the NAACP relocated its Southern 
Regional Office to Atlanta.126  NAACP Regional Director Ruby Hurley, 
realizing that Georgia’s segregationists would welcome her associates about as 
warmly as Alabama’s had, wisely decided to ship all of the important records 
to New York for safekeeping.127  Just as she feared, two weeks after the 
Atlanta office opened, Georgia tried to seize the group’s regional membership 
lists.128  T. V. Williams, the State Revenue Commissioner and, importantly, 
father of the Georgia Commission on Education’s T. V. Williams, Jr., 
demanded that the non-profit group turn over its records to show why it had 
failed to pay any state taxes.129  Instead of filing the letter through normal 
channels, Williams displayed the same flair for dramatics as his son.  Two of 
his agents surprised Hurley at her home in November 1956 and presented her 
with their demands.130  They then accompanied her to the office, where another 
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eight men and an assistant attorney general stormed the room “in a manner 
suggesting the hunt for a criminal.”131  Though she maintained a watchful eye 
on the proceedings, Hurley allowed the agents to look through her office’s files 
and take notes, knowing that much of the information they sought was already 
gone.132 
Still looking for the membership lists, Williams’ agents decided to search 
the separate Atlanta branch office.  Unlike Hurley, local branch president John 
Calhoun did not want the agents to have free rein with his papers.  “I do not 
object to the financial records,” he wrote, “but I hate the idea of their 
‘rummaging’ through our files, picking up things that can later be twisted to 
their purposes.”133  Unsure of what to do, Calhoun stalled for time, hoping to 
contact the national headquarters or, at the very least, speak with his lawyer.  
Williams refused to grant him any reprieve, however, and instead strode down 
to the Fulton County courthouse to file for contempt charges against Calhoun 
and the other officers of the local NAACP.134  In what was either an amazing 
coincidence or a prearranged plot, the presiding judge turned out to be none 
other than Durwood T. Pye, the man who had only recently been replaced by 
Williams’ son as head of the GCE. 
The NAACP was not impressed by the supposed coincidence.  Citing the 
judge’s “repeated denounciations [sic] of the colored race in general and these 
defendants in particular,” they claimed Pye could not try the case impartially 
and therefore should recuse himself.135  The man who at one time led 
Georgia’s segregationist resistance professed to be “amazed” by the 
allegations.136  “I have never denounced the colored race,” he told the 
courtroom.137  “I have strong views with respect to the identity of the races and 
the preservation of their separate and individual accomplishments.  The Court 
has strong personal views against a mongrelization of the races.”138  The 
motion was denied.139  After a six-day trial, Judge Pye made his supposed 
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impartiality clear.  He levied a $25,000 fine against the Atlanta branch of the 
NAACP for contempt.140  As an added measure, he refused to certify the trial 
records, effectively stalling any appeal of the fine.141  Meanwhile, T. V. 
Williams piled it on, using Judge Pye’s predictable ruling to hit the non-profit 
group with an additional assessment of more than $17,000 for eleven years of 
unpaid income taxes.142 
In a more personal attack, Judge Pye leaned on John Calhoun.  He ordered 
the branch president imprisoned until he agreed to turn all of the requested files 
over to the state.143  After a night in jail, Calhoun grudgingly gave in.144  Tired 
of all “this cloak and dagger stuff,” he granted the agents access to his 
office.145  But, Pye was still not done with him.  The judge released Calhoun 
on the contempt charge, yet kept the threat of imprisonment over his head for 
years afterward.  He had sentenced the NAACP leader to twelve months 
incarceration at the trial, generously agreeing to suspend the sentence “so long 
as he behaves himself.”146  For years thereafter, Calhoun lived with that threat.  
When an NAACP attorney appeared before Pye in another case, he asked the 
judge to lift the probation.147  Pye refused: “I am not ready to release him.”148  
Apparently, he never was.  The probationary threat was still in place when Pye 
died.149 
The NAACP tried to remain defiant in the face of Georgia’s massive 
campaign of propaganda and harassment.  “You can’t kill, outlaw or legislate 
away the desire of a people to be free,” the Reverend L. H. Pitts of Atlanta 
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announced in early 1957.150  “A year from now, it may be illegal to carry a 
NAACP membership card in your wallet, but you can carry it in your heart.”151  
In spite of this sentiment, Georgia’s campaign of intimidation did take a sharp 
toll on the NAACP.  Membership dropped steadily in the years after 1957 and 
the organization’s public functions suffered as a result.152  The state conference 
in 1959, for instance, was widely acknowledged to be the “worst in years.”153  
A mere twenty-seven adults registered.154  As NAACP State Secretary Amos 
Holmes noted glumly, “no real interest was evident anywhere.”155  Ruby 
Hurley agreed.  In 1960, she warned that “the situation is serious,” with 
membership down, state contributions at a midyear total of just more than 
$700, and a number of the local chapters being abandoned for lack of 
activity.156 
Georgia’s political campaign of massive resistance had been exhaustive 
and, for its targets, exhausting.  In the half-decade after the Brown ruling, 
Governors Talmadge and Griffin had erected an intricate defense of segregated 
education centered on the “private school plan.”  Should the courts dare order 
the desegregation of Georgia’s public schools, the state would simply rid itself 
of them.  The legislature surrounded this self-destruct mechanism with a host 
of other laws that strengthened segregation and discouraged any deviation 
from the norm.  State officials at every level harassed and hampered the 
opposition, silencing all dissent and strongly encouraging white Georgians to 
conform to a common denominator of white supremacy.  In spite of its 
apparent successes, however, this rather breathtaking campaign of massive 
resistance had essentially failed in one of its principal missions—uniting 
segregationist opposition at the grass-roots level.  As the example of the States’ 
Rights Council of Georgia makes clear, whatever their feelings were about 
segregation and desegregation in the state, ordinary white Georgians 
essentially sat this fight out. 
IV.  FAILING TO ORGANIZE: THE STATES’ RIGHTS COUNCIL OF GEORGIA 
As Georgia’s politicians worked to make the state’s white citizens conform 
to their political views and silence all dissent from white liberals and black 
activists, they assumed that another organization—the States’ Rights Council 
of Georgia (“States’ Rights Council” or “Council”)—would organize ordinary 
white segregationists and mobilize them in a grass-roots defense of white 
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supremacy.  Committed to using “every legal means” for “the preservation of 
the social, political, and economic institutions of our beloved Southland,” the 
Council was led by some of the state’s segregationist giants.157  The first 
chapter, in Augusta, had been established in December 1954 by two leading 
figures in Georgia’s political scene—Roy V. Harris, the four-time Speaker of 
Georgia’s House and perhaps the most successful political operative in the 
state, and Hugh G. Grant, a diplomat who had served as Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s minister to Albania and Thailand.158  In spite of their prestige, 
however, the Council found only a small following in Augusta and even less 
success.  Its greatest triumph, for instance, came when it forced the 
cancellation of the city’s Thirteenth Annual Soap Box Derby in July 1955 
because a pair of black boys had dared to enter the competition.159 
However, the States’ Rights Council gained new strength and scope when 
the rest of Georgia’s political establishment stepped in.  In September 1955, 
Governor Griffin assembled two hundred of the state’s most prominent 
political and business leaders for a strategy session at Atlanta’s Biltmore 
Hotel.160  Speakers included former Governor Herman Talmadge, Lieutenant 
Governor Ernest Vandiver, and two of the state’s top legal minds, R. Carter 
Pittman, a well-known constitutional lawyer, and Charles J. Bloch, past 
president of the Georgia Bar Association and the then-current chairman of the 
education committee of the Board of Regents of the University System of 
Georgia.161  “The NAACP and every other left-wing group is organized,” 
Governor Griffin warned the dignitaries, “and it’s time for those of us who 
believe in Georgia’s traditional way of life to do some organizing.”162  The 
States’ Rights Council of Georgia, as the group would thereafter be known, 
would reach out across the state to consolidate segregationist sentiment at the 
grass-roots level, Griffin promised.163  With many of the Council’s members 
active as officers in state government and as officials with the Georgia 
Commission on Education, segregationists now believed that they presented a 
unified front of massive resistance.164 
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The assembly selected Carter Pittman as president of the States’ Rights 
Council of Georgia.165  An outspoken segregationist and staunch anti-
Communist, the attorney had already made a name for himself speaking out 
against the “non-legal, illegal and inadmissible sociological materials to 
sustain judicial legislation based on false Marxist propaganda secretly supplied 
to the [Warren Court] by [the] NAACP.”166  The articles he authored—with 
telling titles like All Men Are Not Equal and The Supreme Court, the Broken 
Constitution, and the Shattered Bill of Rights—were widely circulated in the 
more literate segregationist circles.167  In his writings and public appearances, 
Pittman’s command of constitutional history was matched only by his 
complete disdain for the Warren Court and its desegregation decision.  (His 
article The Law of the Land, for instance, drew on four hundred years of 
English and American legal thought to discredit the authority of the United 
States Supreme Court.  His final words, however, were a simple invocation of 
John Wilkes Booth: “‘Sic semper tyrannis.’”)168  Time and again, Pittman 
insisted that segregation was not a problem.  It was, instead, the solution.  “The 
South has no racial problem and has had none for a half century,” he told the 
Georgia Institute of City and County Attorneys a few weeks after his 
appointment.  “Its racial problems were solved by segregation.”169 
Under Pittman’s leadership, the Council set up offices in downtown 
Atlanta that fall, hiring a full-time clerical staff and appointing an executive 
director to oversee its statewide crusade.170  For that post, the Council relied on 
the Reverend William T. Bodenhamer, a Baptist minister, representative in the 
General Assembly, and member of the State Board of Education who had 
served as a principal, superintendent, and president of a junior college.171  
Bodenhamer’s credentials did not stop there.  He was an active civic leader, 
holding memberships with the Rotarians, the Civitans, the Shriners, the 
Knights Templar, and the Sons of Confederate Veterans, and was a thirty-
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second degree Mason as well.172  With ties to virtually every group in Georgia, 
he seemed eminently qualified for the task of setting up local chapters of the 
States’ Rights Council in each of Georgia’s one hundred-fifty-nine counties 
and boosting the total membership to the goal of 150,000.173 
In spite of the credentials of Pittman and Bodenhamer and the support of 
the entire state establishment, the Council actually accomplished very little.  In 
fact, its first foray in defense of segregation brought the organization nothing 
but embarrassment.  In late November 1955, the football team at Georgia Tech 
accepted an invitation to play against the University of Pittsburgh in the Sugar 
Bowl.174  Tech had a strong football tradition, counting past legend John 
Heisman and present leader Bobby Dodd among its revered coaches.175  At the 
time of the Sugar Bowl offer, the Tech squad was at the peak of its 1950s 
power and popularity, having won six bowl bids in a row.176  But, with this 
latest invitation, there was a problem.  The University of Pittsburgh had a 
single black player, a reserve fullback.177  The executive committee of the 
States’ Rights Council fired off a concerned telegram to Georgia Tech Coach 
Bobby Dodd, urging him to prevent “any breakdown of our laws, customs, and 
traditions of racial segregation.”178  Governor Griffin, always ready to steal the 
segregationist spotlight, soon joined in.  “The South stands at Armageddon,” 
the governor dramatically announced.  He stated: 
We cannot make the slightest concession to the enemy in this dark and 
lamental [sic] hour of struggle.  There is no difference in compromising 
integrity of race on the playing field than in doing so in the classrooms.  One 
break in the dike and the relentless seas will rush in and destroy us.179 
The Sugar Bowl bid, the governor said, would have to be canceled.180 
To Griffin’s surprise, Georgia Tech’s students were outraged.  That night, 
they hung effigies of the governor from trees on campus and then took to the 
streets of Atlanta in protest.181  With signs saying “Impeach Griffin” and “To 
Hell with Griffin,” more than two thousand students stormed the State Capitol, 
scuffling with guards and agents of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and 
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causing a good bit of damage in the process.182  Meanwhile, another five 
hundred showed up outside the governor’s mansion, tearing up parking meters 
and tossing trash cans down the street.183  As the Atlanta Fire Department 
stood by with canisters of tear gas, a wall of city policemen formed a barricade 
in front of the mansion.184  Some students tried to break through the lines and 
reach Griffin, only to be dragged away by the police.185  In the end, a full-
blown riot was only averted because State Representative Milton M. “Muggsy” 
Smith, a former Georgia Tech player himself, showed up and calmed the 
crowd down.186  In the end, Griffin and his allies backed down and allowed the 
game to go ahead as originally planned.187  Segregation might be a revered 
Southern tradition, they realized, but it was no match for college football. 
Hoping to recover from the Sugar Bowl embarrassment, the States’ Rights 
Council began holding rallies across Georgia.  In January 1956, the campaign 
got off to an auspicious start with a membership drive in Americus, a county 
seat with a population of roughly 11,000.188  In an impressive show of support, 
Herman Talmadge, Marvin Griffin, Eugene Cook, Ernest Vandiver, Roy 
Harris, and R. Carter Pittman were all present to shake hands and recruit new 
members.189  Speaking to the crowd, Governor Griffin called for the 
establishment of Council chapters in every town.190  “The rest of the nation,” 
he stated, “is looking to Georgia for the lead in segregation.”191  Talmadge, 
who was then about to begin his successful quest for the United States Senate, 
declared the rally “the beginning of a great crusade which will sweep the state 
and southern regions.”192  In the weeks thereafter, Bodenhamer and Pittman 
crisscrossed the state, trying to sell memberships and set up chapters of the 
segregationist group.193  Bodenhamer boasted of personally holding twenty-
eight different rallies in the month of March alone.194  In spite of these efforts, 
the results were disappointing.  By mid-summer, there were less than a dozen 
chapters linked to the Atlanta headquarters.195 
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In an effort to drum up support, the Council then blanketed the state with 
propaganda.  “WHITE AMERICAN CITIZENS UNDER ATTACK!” warned 
one piece.196  “The Supreme Court on May 17, 1954, declared that racial 
segregation in the public schools of the nation is unconstitutional.  THIS IS 
REVOLUTION!”197  The only solution, the pamphlet continued, was to 
“ORGANIZE: There is a job to be done.  Don’t be lulled into complacency by 
the soothing talk of ‘Gradual’ race integration.  There must never be ANY 
racial integration.”198  While whites across Georgia generally agreed with such 
sentiments, they still felt no need to join the Council.  After organizers totaled 
up the membership lists in 1958, they were stunned by how little had been 
accomplished in more than three years of campaigning.  “Total number of 
members in the active file is 2,450 for [the] entire state,” an official noted 
dejectedly.199  “If only those members who have paid their dues for 1958 were 
counted, they would not exceed 500.”200  For an organization that had assumed 
it could quickly and easily reach a total membership of 150,000,201 these 
figures were startling, to say the least. 
Publicly, leaders of the massive resistance movement attributed the weak 
membership in the Council to a vast left-wing conspiracy against segregation.  
Atlanta’s Congressman James C. Davis led the attack.  At a Council meeting at 
the Atlanta Athletic Club, he thundered: 
The left-wing press, left-wing columnists and writers, the left-wing 
commentators on television and radio, together with all of the left-wing 
organizations in the country beginning with the Communists and ending with 
organizations that are merely crackpot, are staging a massive campaign of 
super-brain-washing propaganda having a two-fold purpose.202 
“These purposes are, first, to sell law-abiding American people the false 
idea that no one has the right to question a pronouncement of the Supreme 
Court, and second, that those who have any pride of race are bigoted, 
prejudiced, narrow-minded racists and hate-mongers.”203  Congressman Davis 
then went on to dispel the notion that he himself was a “narrow-minded racist” 
by detailing the “obvious and well-known differences between whites and 
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blacks which no amount of glossing over and covering up by subversive so-
called ‘anthropologists’ and pseudo-scientists can hide.”  He said that the 
differences included the uncleanliness, mental inferiority, and natural 
criminality of blacks.204 
In spite of such public pronouncements, Council officials privately 
admitted that their problems were internal ones.  First, they had made a fatal 
step in selecting Reverend William T. Bodenhamer as head of the recruitment 
drive.  “Our director was a member of the Legislature, a minister, and a 
member of the State School Board,” Carter Pittman complained.205  “In my 
opinion he did not average more than twelve hours a week in our Atlanta office 
and when he spent that time in our office, he was doing nothing toward serving 
our membership.”206  If anything, the minister from Ty Ty proved to be a 
tremendous drain on the office, using its funds for his own pet projects and 
personal needs.207  (“When I learned that he installed a dictaphone in his car at 
the expense of the Council,” Pittman told an associate, “I nearly had a heart 
attack.”)208  A complete failure, Bodenhamer was forced out in early 1958.209  
The Council tried to begin again, but the task seemed daunting.  Pittman 
complained to Bodenhamer’s replacement, “we are exactly where we were in 
the spring of 1955, we must start from there.”210 
However, more important than these personnel problems of the Council 
were its political problems.  From its founding, the Council had been used by 
politicians solely as a sounding board for their own campaigns.  With all of 
their effort spent puffing up their segregationist credentials before the voters, 
the Council leaders devoted little time to actual grass-roots organization.211  
After a few years, Hugh Grant had to admit that his Council had become “a 
political rather than a grass roots organization.”212  In case anyone missed that 
distinction, Bill Bodenhamer soon managed to make it perfectly clear.  
Immediately after being forced out of the organization, the minister launched a 
campaign for the governor’s office, claiming that he alone was qualified to 
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prevent the desegregation of Georgia’s schools.213  Absurdly, he claimed his 
main rival, Lieutenant Governor Ernest Vandiver, was somehow “‘soft’ on 
segregation.”214  To the contrary, Vandiver had asserted that “there is not 
enough money in the federal treasury nor enough federal troops to force us to 
mix the races in the classrooms of the schools and colleges of Georgia while I 
am your governor.”215  “You and I say to the United States Supreme Court,” 
Vandiver shouted to applauding crowds, “that we will resist this tyranny at 
every crossroads, at every filling station, in every hamlet, in every militia 
district, in every town, in every city and in every county throughout the length 
and breadth of the State of Georgia until sanity is restored in the land.”216  In 
light of such statements, Bodenhamer’s charges that Vandiver was the 
“NAACP’s candidate” simply fell flat.217  In fact, his charges backfired.218  As 
voters compared Bodenhamer’s rhetoric with his record, they were less than 
impressed.  Segregationists across the state publicly blamed him for the failure 
of the States’ Rights Council.219  “The preacher candidate,” Roy Harris 
charged, “sabotaged it by simply failing to do his duty.  He did as little of 
nothing as a man could do when he held the office of Executive Director of the 
council.”220  While Bodenhamer should have been organizing the state’s 
resistance network, Harris noted, he instead “used the office in Atlanta for his 
own personal and political benefit.”221  The Bodenhamer campaign was 
crippled by the counterattack, and Ernest Vandiver won the election in a 
landslide.222  He carried one hundred-fifty-six of one hundred-fifty-nine 
counties, beating the preacher by a margin of more than four-to-one in the 
popular vote.223 
As it turned out, the defeat of Bill Bodenhamer also marked the downfall 
of the States’ Rights Council.  After the factionalism of the 1958 campaign, the 
Council seemed more than ever to be simply a sounding board for 
segregationist politicians and their speechwriters.  Not even the rise of an 
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established, behind-the-scenes, segregationist like Roy Harris to its presidency 
changed that problem.  Speaking out against the Council’s political inclinations 
in 1960, Hugh Grant charged that Harris, with whom he had founded the first 
States’ Rights Council six years earlier, had only given “lip service to the 
organization of the rank and file.”224  With no foundation of grass-roots 
support below and an abundance of political factionalism above, the 
organization simply withered away.  In 1962, the States’ Rights Council of 
Georgia—at one time seen as the greatest hope for a statewide defense of 
segregation—finally collapsed.225 
At the same time, the infighting of the 1958 campaign also served to 
cripple the Council’s unofficial counterpart, the Georgia Commission on 
Education.226  In July 1958, Harvey H. Chandler, the assistant executive 
secretary of the GCE, resigned, charging that T. V. Williams, Jr. had turned the 
office into a publicity center for the Bodenhamer campaign.227  Chandler 
claimed that GCE personnel had sent out 500,000 pieces of “false, scurrilous, 
malicious, doctored and defamatory pictures and literature” aimed at Ernest 
Vandiver’s defeat.228  Under intense pressure, Williams resigned and the GCE 
quickly fell from its former position of prominence.229  Not surprisingly, after 
his election, Governor Vandiver disbanded the Commission.230  He replaced it 
with a new agency, the Governor’s Commission on Constitutional 
Government, but this organization quickly faded from view as well.231 
The collapse of the Georgia Commission on Education and the States’ 
Rights Council of Georgia meant that the segregationist politicians at the top of 
the state’s massive resistance movement no longer had even the pretense of 
organizational support underneath them.  To be sure, the vast majority of 
whites supported their “defense” of segregation and kept returning them to 
office on that basis.  However, aside from giving them their votes, these whites 
were little involved in the practical campaign against desegregation.  When 
court-ordered desegregation finally struck the state in 1961—at both the 
University of Georgia in Athens and the public high schools of Atlanta232—
political posturing could do little to stop it.  Ordinary segregationist whites 
watched in disbelief as the state’s capital and flagship university “fell” to the 
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forces of integration.233  As they were lost, so too was the cause of massive 
resistance. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
From the beginning, the forces behind the political movement known as 
“massive resistance” had assumed that the key to maintaining white supremacy 
in the South was to first ensure white solidarity.  However, instead of 
encouraging a grass-roots effort to mobilize rank-and-file segregationists in 
support of the larger cause, these politicians decided to pursue a top-down 
approach in which they told ordinary white Southerners how to act, while 
never giving them reasons or inspiration to mobilize themselves.  These 
average segregationists had been assured all along that the state and regional 
campaigns of political massive resistance would hold the civil rights 
movement at bay, and they had thus given little thought about their own role in 
resistance until it was too late. 
This account of the political failures of the massive resistance movement is 
not meant to imply that Southern whites offered no resistance to the civil rights 
movement.  They did, of course.  As activists in the civil rights movement 
pursued their campaigns of non-violent direct action in countless communities 
across the South, whites often reacted to their struggle with reprisals of 
intimidation, violence, and oppression.  As brutal and often bloody as that 
strand of white resistance was, it essentially represented a localized reaction 
that was both unplanned and uncoordinated at either the state or regional level.  
As such, that kind of white resistance to civil rights change proved to be a 
much more chaotic and, ultimately, a much more ineffective “defense” of 
segregation than the coordinated campaign of “massive resistance” that had 
originally been plotted by the region’s political leaders. 
In spite of their grand plans, massive resistance had essentially remained 
an operation of politicians alone.  As such, it lacked the broad constituency and 
staying power it needed to survive.  Its leaders had promised to “protect” the 
South from desegregation and indeed, for a short time, they did succeed in 
stalling the implementation of the Brown ruling.  In the end, however, their 
actions lulled the white population into a false confidence, which made the 
inevitable desegregation of Southern society all the more shocking to their 
eyes.  Massive resistance had not protected the old racial caste system of the 
South.  It had, perversely, helped assure its failure. 
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